

# **Economic Consequences of Limiting Base Erosion with Outbound Investment**

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# Thoughts on the Tax Cuts and Job Act


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## Issues

- The Positive Externality of Outbound Provisions
- GILTI and the Cost of Real Capital Abroad
- GILTI and the Benefit of Foreign Tax Changes
- Remaining Problems

# The Positive Externality of Outbound Provisions

- Often, anti-avoidance measures benefit the tax revenues of host **and** parent's home country.



# **The Positive Externality of Outbound Provisions**

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- CFC rules may levy additional taxes for the legislating country.
- At the same time, tightening CFC rules may affect the cost of capital of affiliates owned by the legislating country (Haufler, Mardan, Schindler, 2016).  
  
→ Reduced competitiveness
- GILTI as an alternative?

## **GILTI and the Cost of Real Capital Abroad**

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- Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI)
- GILTI = CFC net income
  - 10% of aggregate tangible depreciable business property (QBAI).
- Inclusion of 50% of GILTI in US tax base
- New: GILTI may tie the possibility to earn low taxed income abroad to the amount of tangible capital invested abroad (Qual. Business Asset Investment).
- To what extent is this an implicit subsidy to foreign tangible investment?

# **GILTI and the Cost of Real Capital Abroad**

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- Some countries in the past have done similar things with CFC rules.
- Germany 1992-1994: CFC rule did not bite if a CFC had at least 50% in active income.
- Theoretical cost of capital reduction of German investment in Ireland by some 28%.

# GILTI and the Cost of Real Capital Abroad

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- GILTI implication; simple case
  - Abstract from depreciation
  - Effective zero foreign tax (possibly due to shifting and tax havens)
  - Therefore no FTC on GILTI income
  - All equity finance of CFCs abroad
  - Given after tax discount rate  $r$
- Cost of capital in a simple exemption system
  - $F'(K^*) = r$
- Cost of capital with GILTI (if GILTI > 0,  $t^*=0$ )
  - $F'(K^*) - 0.5 t^{US} [ 10\% - F'(K^*) ] = r$  or
  - $$F'(K^*) = \frac{r - 0.5 t^{US} \cdot 10\%}{1 - 0.5 t}$$

# GILTI and the Cost of Real Capital Abroad

- With  $F'(K^*) = \frac{r - 0.5t^{US} \cdot 10\%}{1 - 0.5t^{US}}$ ,
  - the cost of capital  $F'$
  - and also the deviation from a simple exemption system depend on  $r$ .

$r$	$F'(K), \text{GILTI}$	Deviation
5.0%	4.4%	-12%
6.0%	5.5%	-8%
7.0%	6.6%	-5%
8.0%	7.8%	-3%
9.0%	8.9%	-1%
10.0%	10.0%	0%

- Intuition: only low-return real income reduces GILTI. Low-return real income is only acceptable if  $r$  is low.



## GILTI and the Cost of Real Capital Abroad

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- GILTI implication with positive foreign tax rate  $t^*$
- Economic profit /w given intangibles  $I^*$
- Assume  $F(K^*, I^*) > 10\%K^*$ .

1)  $\Pi = (1 - t^*)F(K^*, I^*)$  (Net income after foreign taxes)

$-0.5t^{US} \{ [F(.) - 10\%K] + t^* [F(.) - 10\%K] \}$  (US tax on inc. + FTC)

$+0.8t^* [F(.) - 10\%K]$  (limited FTC)

$-rK$  (Opportunity cost of capital)

# GILTI and the Cost of Real Capital Abroad

- Cost of capital with  $t^* = 10\%$

r	simple exemption	GILTI	Deviation
5.0%	5.6%	5.4%	-3%
6.0%	6.7%	6.5%	-2%
7.0%	7.8%	7.7%	-1%
8.0%	8.9%	8.8%	-1%
9.0%	10.0%	10.0%	0%
10.0%	11.1%	11.2%	0%

## GILTI and the Benefit of Foreign Tax Changes

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- GILTI and the incentives to change LOW foreign tax rates to attract US CFCs.
- What is the value to a US-owned CFC when the host country rate is marginally increased?
- Taking the derivative of 1) w.r.t.  $t^*$  (using envelope theorem):
- $\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial t^*} = -0.305 \cdot F(K^*, I^*) - 0.695 \cdot 10\% \cdot K$

$$= 1 \text{ if } F(K^*, I^*) = 10\% \cdot K$$

$$< 1 \text{ if } F(K^*, I^*) > 10\% \cdot K$$

The higher the profitability, the less negative a tax increase.

## Remaining Problems

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Remaining Problems as I suspect them

- 50% deduction leads to low revenue compared to traditional CFC rules.
- No carryforward of FTCs → Preference for low risk operations; penalty for operations with huge profitability in one year and losses in another.
- Dividends are excluded from tested income, but what about one-time sales of assets/shares by foreign CFCs? (Again, no carryforward of FTC may be a problem.)

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Thank you for your attention!